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Casenotes
United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
Ltd.: Undercollateralized Creditors Cry
Timber to the Right to Compensation
for Interest on the Value of Collateral.
Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, (the B.R.A.),1 a debtor
was required to pay interest to a creditor holding a security interest
in collateral with a value that exceeded the amount of the outstanding
debt. 2 Once the debtor filed bankruptcy, interest accrued on the value
of the collateral to the extent that the debt exceeded the value of
the collateral.3 The B.R.A. codified the principle that oversecured
creditors have a right to compensation for the delay in foreclosing
upon the secured collateral. 4 The B.R.A. allows an oversecured
creditor to collect all fees, costs, and charges including postpetition
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
2. See In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380, 1381 (5th Cir. 1986),
aff'd on rehearing, 808 F.2d 383 (1987) (en banc). This type of creditor will be referred to as
an "oversecured creditor."
3. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) (1982 & Supp. 1987) The period after the debtor files under
sections 301, 302, 303 or 304 of the bankruptcy code, which commences a case, will be referred
to as "postpetition".
4. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 356 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978) (noting that fees are available only to the extent that the value of
the debt is exceeded by the value of the collateral).
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interest that arises from the loan agreement which is the basis of the
claim. 5 Contrary to the law for oversecured creditors, pre-B.R.A.
law precluded undersecured creditors from receiving payment of
postpetition interest on the collateral of an undersecured creditor. 6
The B.R.A. does not mention undersecured creditors' rights to fore-
closure.7 Congress' silence in the B.R.A. about whether an under-
secured creditor is absolutely entitled to foreclosure caused extensive
litigation in the bankruptcy and appellate courts and resulted in a
split of authority among the courts of appeal and lower bankruptcy
courts." In United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates, Ltd.,9 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the conflicting interpretations between three Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeal of whether the undersecured creditor has an absolute right
to adequate protection of the right to foreclosure. 10 The Court in
Timbers concluded that an undersecured creditor's lack of an absolute
possessory right to collateral eliminates the requirement for adequate
protection through postpetition interest payments."
Part I of this note discusses the legal background of the B.R.A.,12
the sections of the B.R.A. that have generated conflicting interpre-
tations, in the case presented, and earlier judicial decisions which
conflict with the interpretation in the Timbers court regarding the
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987). See also In re United Merchants and Mfrs.,
Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 138 (2nd Cir. 1982) (section 506(b) codifies pre-Code law that oversecured
creditors may claim interest under a credit agreement).
6. United Say. Ass'n. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 108 S. Ct.
626, 634 (1988). The Court noted pre-bankruptcy code authority supporting and contradicting
the proposition that undersecured creditors (a creditor holding a security interest in collateral
with a value that is exceeded by the outstanding debt) have an absolute entitlement to
foreclosure. Id. at 635. The Court, however, discounted contradictory authority as being based
on the additional finding that reorganization was not sufficiently likely or was being unduly
delayed. Id.
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
8. Compare In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that undersecured creditors' collateral is not entitled to protection), aff'd on rehearing,
808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc) and In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the question of compensation to the undersecured creditor is a case-by-case
determination and not a per se matter) with Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp.,
754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation
once relief from the automatic stay is requested) and In re Am. Mariner Indus., Inc. 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation during
the term of the automatic stay).
9. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
10. See infra notes 47-80 and accompanying text (discussing the uncodified definition of
adequate protection).
11. Timbers 108 S. Ct. at 635.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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applicable code provisions.' 3 Part II discusses the facts of Timbers
and reviews the analysis and decision of the United States Supreme
Court. 4 Part III explores the legal ramifications of Timbers.
5
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Bankrupcty Reform Act of 1978
Congress enacted the B.R.A. to modernize a bankruptcy system
that had survived forty years without a comprehensive change. 16 The
new code accounted for the vast changes that occurred in the areas
of consumer and commercial credit, including the exponential increase
in the use of credit by Americans and developing case law associated
with the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. 17 Additionally,
the revisions in the law reflected the change in public policy on
bankruptcy. 8 The B.R.A. provides three ways to liquidate or reor-
ganize the debtor's assets and liabilities: Chapter 719 discusses liqui-
dation; Chapter 1120 provides guidelines for reorganization; and
Chapter 1321 discusses adjustment of debts of an individual with
regular income. Congress introduced Chapter 11 by amending the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the Chandler Act in 1938.22 Chapter
11 of the B.R.A. consolidates Chapters 10, 11, and 12 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and subsequent amendments into a single
comprehensive chapter for all business reorganizations.?
13. See infra notes 16-146 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 147-206 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 207-223 and accompanying text.
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See Klee, Legislative History of the
New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 941 (1979) (discussion of the evolution of
bankruptcy law). See generally C. WVaREN, BAKturcY iN Tma UNrrED STATES HISTORY
(1935) (a complete history of the bankruptcy law in the 19th century).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmrN. NEWS 5963, 5965 (noting that the bankruptcy system to date was designed in "the
horse and buggy era of consumer and commercial credit ... ").
18. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform of 1978, 53 AM. BAN-c. L.J. 1 (1979) (discussing
highlights and major areas of changc from pre-code law).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
20. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
21. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
22. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). See Klee, supra note 16(a), at 941)
(discussing historical considerations made by Congress). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was
amended several times on a piecemeal basis, with the most comprehensive changes occurring
with the Chandler Act of 1938. Id. at 943. See Bankruptcy Act of 1989, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
23. (1978) H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 223-24 reprinted in, U.S. CODE
1311
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The fundamental goal of Chapter 11 is to give the debtor the
opportunity to revive business as an alternative to outright liquida-
tion.U Chapter 11 seeks to preserve the debtor's estate by granting
the debtor temporary relief from creditors' claims.2 The temporary
relief allows the debtor time to formulate a plan for repayment of
debts from future earnings.26 This reorganization of the debtor's
property is done under judicial supervision.27
Chapter 11 procedures allow a limited time in which the debtor
has the exclusive right to file a reorganization plan 28 and obtain the
acceptance of the plan29 from the classes 0 of impaired creditors.3'
CONG. & Arnmw. NEws 1978, 5795, 6182-83. See also B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, BANKRUPTCY
LAW MAmuAL, § 8.03 (1980). The bankruptcy commission took the best provisions of Chapters
10, 11 and 12 and consolidated them into Chapter 11. Id. Also, by consolidating these chapters,
the bankruptcy courts were given greater leeway in dealing with troubled businesses. Id.
24. See Lines v. Fredrick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (discussing the meaning of property
attachable by the estate in consideration of basic purpose of Bankruptcy Act). See also In re
Chugiak Boat Works, Inc., 18 Bankr. 292, 298 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1982) (noting the purpose of
Chapter 11 is to prevent those liquidations that are avoidable); B. Weintraub & A. Resnick,
supra note 23, at § 8.01. "[I]t is often preferable to encourage and facilitate rehabilitation of
businesses in financial trouble instead of providing for liquidation only." Id. See generally
Blair, Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 58 Am. BANKR. L.J.
197 (1984) (discussing history of Chapter 11 reorganization); Donnelly, The New (Proposed?)
Bankruptcy Act: The Development of Its Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the
Interests of Consumer Debtors, 18 SANTA CIARA L. Rav. 291, 317-20 (1978) (discussing public
policy interest in treatment of debtor by bankruptcy laws).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ammri. NEws 5963, 6293. The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a
liquidation case, is to restructure a business' finances so that it may operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. Id. The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry
for which they were designated are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. Id.




28. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(b), (c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The debtor has the exclusive right
to file a plan with the bankruptcy court within 120 days following the date of filing and 60
days to obtain the necessary acceptances, after which time a party in interest may file a plan.
Id. A party in interest may include the debtor, the trustee, a creditor's committee, an equity
security holder's committee, a creditor, an equity securing holder, or an indenture trustee. Id.
§ 1121(c). See generally Rosen & Rodriquez, Section 1121 and Non-Debtor Plans of Reorgan-
ization, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (1982) (discussing reorganization plans).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1982 & Supp. 1987). A creditor who holds a claim recognized
under the Code may accept or reject a plan. Id. § 1126(a).
30. Id. § 1122. Section 1122 provides that claims are to be grouped into classes with
those which are substantially similar in regards to the nature of the claim or interest classified.
Id. See generally, Rosenfeld, Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 and 13
Cases, 75 CAns. L. Ray. 391 (1987) (discussing the importance of flexibility and fairness in
the classification of claims process).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982 & Supp. 1987). A claim is impaired if it will not be repaid
in full or its legal rights are altered. Id. An interest is also considered impaired if it is adversely
affected. Id. See generally Mallory & Phelan, To Impair or Not to Impair-That is the
1312
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The bankruptcy court will confirm the plan if section 1123 require-
ments are met32 and all impaired creditors accept the plan in
accordance with sections 112931 and 1126(f).34 If an impaired class
does not accept the plan,35 the plan proponent must resort to a
"cram-down" procedure to achieve confirmation. 36 The "cram-
down" procedure allows for confirmation of a plan if a majority
of at least one class of creditors votes to accept the plan, the plan
is not unfairly discriminatory, the value of the rejecting class' claims
is fully protected, and the plan is fair and equitable with regard to
all classes of claims.37 After all impaired creditors voluntarily accept
Question in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 869 (1986) (discussing alternatives
available to the debtor during negotiations with creditors when formulating a plan).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The plan must include seven provisions:
(1) Divide creditors into classes, and the claims of creditors in the same class must be
substantially similar;, (2) state which claims are not impaired as defined in title 11, section
1124 of the United States Code; (3) specify the treatment of each class of interest that is
impaired; (4) provide for the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class,
unless the holder consents to a less favorable treatment; (5) provide for adequate means for
its execution; (6) if the debtor is a corporation, include a provision prohibiting the issuance
of nonvoting equity securities, and protecting the several classes of voting securities; and (7)
be consistent with the interest of the creditors and equity holders and with public policy with
respect to the manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee or his successor under
the plan. Id. See Watkins, The Chapter 11 Plan, PRc. LAw., Dec. 1, 1982, at 11 (discussing
the requirements of a reorganization plan under the bankruptcy code).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 1129 provides for confirmation of a
plan under two conditions: when it is accepted by every class or when it is accepted by at
least one class. Id. Whether the plan is accepted by all classes or less than all classes, eleven
requirements must be met. Id. § 1129(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
34. 11 U.S.C. 1126(f) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Creditors that will be repaid in full, with no
alteration of the legal rights to their claim, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the
plan. The debtor need solicit an acceptance only from the impaired creditor. Id. See generally
Fogel, Confirmation and the Unimpaired Class of Creditors: Is a "Deemed Acceptance"
Deemed an Acceptance?, 58 Am. BArtx. L.J. 151 (1984) (discussing the requirements of a
presumed acceptance).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (d) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The plan is deemed accepted by a class
of claims if accepted by the holders of at least two-thirds of the total amount claimed and
more than one-half of the total number of claims. Id. § 1126(c).
36. See generally Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About the Bankruptcy Cram-
Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANR. L.J. 133 (1979) (discussing confir-
mation by the cram-down method); Helldorfer, Book Review, 42 Bus. LAw. 287 (1986)
(reviewing Booth, The Cram down on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60
AM. BxAN. L.J. 69 (1986)).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987). In order for a plan to be fair and
equitable with respect to a class of secured claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A) requires the plan to
provide:
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether
the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another
entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and (II) that each holder
of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments
totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest
in such property;
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the plan or accept involuntarily through the "cram-down" proce-
dures, the bankruptcy court will consider the debtor's ability to
repay the claims filed against the estate by his creditors before
confirming the plan.38
To facilitate formation of a reorganization plan,3 9 the B.R.A.
provides the debtor's fundamental need for temporary relief by
imposing an automatic stay upon commencement of the bankruptcy
proceedingsA0 The stay has two purposes. First, the stay preserves
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject
to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens on proceeds under
clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
Id. The fair and equitable test is applied differently to, but uniformly between, unsecured
creditors and equity owners. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B), (C). See generally Blum, The "Fair and
Equitable" Standard for Confirming Reorganizations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54
Am. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1980) (discussing case law application of fair and equitable standard);
Watkins, supra note 32, at 24 (discussion of prerequisites for confirmation of a reorganization
plan).
38. See Pizza of Haw., Inc. v. Shakey's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure
to provide for payment of civil judgment caused rejection of the plan); In re Mahoney, 80
Bankr. 197, 201 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987) (plan confrmation denied based on absence of
evidence of feasibility or that creditors would be receiving more than they would under Chapter
7 liquidation); In re Brusseau, 57 Bankr. 457, 459 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (confirmation of
plan depends on debtor's ability to pay claims at least in the amount that would be received
under a Chapter 7 liquidation).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-2 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978). Bankruptcy law provides the fundamental protection of the
automatic stay to protect the debtor from claims of his creditors, and permit him to create a
repayment or reorganization plan H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339(1977). Id.
See generally Gesslin, Section 362-The Automatic Stay, 1986 ANm. Suav. BANIt. L. 373
(1986). Commentators have called the retention of the automatic stay the cornerstone of the
bankruptcy code. Id.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. 1987). With certain exceptions, the filing of a
petition operates as a stay to:
(1) the commencement or contination, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor
or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement
of the case under this title; (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate
or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; (4)
any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate; (5) any
act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title; (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (7) the
setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and (8) the commencement
or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the
debtor.
Id. See Pistole v. Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (discusses the concept of the
automatic stay being designed to afford the debtor a breathing spell in which to formulate a
1314
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what remains of the debtor's estate by preventing creditors from
enforcing liens or collecting claims against the debtor or the property
of the estate. 41 Second, the stay protects the creditor's position by
providing a systematic equitable liquidation procedure for all secured
and unsecured creditors.42 The stay procedurally maintains the cred-
itor's position by allowing for the maximization of the value of the
estate, ending competition among the creditors, and promoting equal-
ity of distribution among creditors of the same class.43 Consequently,
the automatic stay allows the estate to stay in one piece."4
The automatic stay commences the date the petition is filed, except
as against certain claims, 45 and continues until the property in ques-
plan). See also Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 1980 ANN. Suarv.
BANKI. L., 23 (1980) (discussing scope and duration of the automatic stay provisions of the
code); Comment, Automatic Stay Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Equitable Roadblock
to Secured Creditor Relief, 17 SAN DmGo L. Rnv. 1113, 1124-26 (1980) (discussing effects of
automatic stay on secured creditors).
41. John Deere Co. v. Kozak Farm, Inc., 47 Bankr. 399, 402 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding
that the bankruptcy judge has broad discretionary powers in extending a stay to protect the
debtor's property; In re Lee, 35 Bankr. 452, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (the stay is concerned
primarily with temporary protection of the debtor). In re Haffner, 25 Bankr. 882, 887 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1982) (noting that the automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADwMN. Nmvs 6298-99 (discussing concern over status quo of
parties). See also In re Towner Petroleum Co., 48 Bankr. 182,185 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985)
(automatic stay implements goals of preventing dissipation of debtor's estate during bankruptcy
proceedings).
42. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADnMN. NEws 6296-97; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADimw. NEws 5840-41. See In re H & W Enters., Inc., 19 Bankr. 582, 587 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1982) (discussing protection of debtor's estate as the purpose of the automatic
stay); In re Mr. D Realty Co., 27 Bankr. 359, 364 (Bankr. S.D. Oh, 1983) (protection of
status quo is fundamental concern of creditors); United States v. Sayres, 43 Bankr. 437, 439
(W.D. N.Y. 1984) (intended effect of automatic stay is preservation of the status quo of the
parties).
43. Id. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U. S. CODE CONG.
& AnDumN. NEws 6296-97; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U. S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIm. NEws 5840-41.
44. In re LaPorta, 26 Bankr. 687, 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that purpose of
automatic stay is to prevent dismemberment of the estate).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
There are eleven exceptions that will prevent an automatic stay from going into
effect: (1) Criminal actions or proceedings against the debtor; (2) collection of
alimony, maintenance, and support from nonestate property; (3) any act to perfect
an interest in property to a limited extent; (4) governmental actions to enforce policy
or regulatory powers; (5) enforcement of nonmoney judgments obtained in govern-
mental, police, or regulatory powers; (5) enforcement of nonmoney judgments
obtained in governmental, police, or regulatory proceedings; (6) set-offs involving
mutual debts and claims in certain securities; (7) set-offs by a repossession participant;
(8) foreclosure of certain properties by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment; (9) issuances of notices of tax deficiency; (10) acts by lessors; and (11)
presentments of negotiable instruments.
Id.
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tion is no longer property of the estate or until the court grants
relief.47 Bankruptcy courts have specific and general discretionary
authority to grant relief from the stay to resolve the conflict between
the debtor who primarily benefits from the time delay granted by
the automatic stay and the secured creditors whose rights to enforce
the claims against the collateral are adversely affected by the time
delay.4 Section 506 of the B.R.A. specifically provides the overse-
cured creditor with a method to minimize the effect of the automatic
stay. 9 Generally, the B.R.A. precludes the creditor from making
certain claims, including interest which accrues postpetition. 0 How-
ever, the B.R.A. entitles an oversecured creditor to postpetition
interest limited to the value of the collateral as an element of the
claim.5 Consequently, the oversecured creditor is prevented from
collecting on a claim until confirmation of the plan, but the equity
cushion allows the claim to increase in value throughout the duration
of the stay. 52
46. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (stay of any claim against property of estate
is effective until property is not property of estate). See Draggo Elec. Co., Inc. v. Indiana
Employment Sec. Div., 57 Bankr. 916, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (confirmation of a plan
of reorganization terminates the existence of the estate); In re Knight, 3 Collier Bankr. Cas.
2d (MB) 742, 746, 747 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (stay terminated when trustee abandoned estate's
interest in property).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
Section 362(d) provides that on request of a party in interest and after notice and
a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a)
by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay: (1) for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in
interest; or (2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection
(a) of this section, if-(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(0, (h) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (providing relief to prevent irreparable damage prior
to notice and a hearing on the stay and relief for willful violation of the stay,
respectively).
48. Flaschen, Adequate Protection for Oversecured Creditors, 61 Am. BANca. L.J. 341
(1987) (discussion of remedies available to a oversecured creditor burdened with an automatic
stay).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
50. Id. § 502(b)(2) (a claim filed under section 501 is allowed except to the extent that
the claim is for unmatured interest).
51. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 68 (1978). Section 506(b) codified pre-code law by allowing an oversecured creditor
to collect fees, costs and charges arising from the agreement forming the basis of the claim.
Id. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355-56 (1977). Such fees are available only to
the extent of the equity cushion, the amount that the value of the collateral exceeds the value
of the debt. Id. See generally, Pistole v. Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984)
(discussng definition of equity cushion); Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations
in Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Code, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 430 (1983) (discussing
the creditor's right to interest under the bankruptcy code).
52. See supra note 51. See generally Flaschen, Adequate Protection for Oversecured
1316
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Generally, debtors may benefit from the protection provided by
the automatic stay if the effect of the stay is balanced against the
corresponding detriment to the secured creditor.5 3 Section 362(d) of
the B.R.A. empowers bankruptcy courts to grant, if necessary,
complete relief from the automatic stay to both oversecured and
undersecured creditors.5 4 Upon request of a party in interest, typically
a secured creditor, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the
stay by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning the stay
if either of two conditions is met.5 5 First, the creditor must show
sufficient cause, including the lack of adequate protection of the
creditor's claim.5 6 If adequate protection is lacking, the bankruptcy
court may provide relief in accordance with section 361. 57 Second, a
court may grant relief from the stay if the debtor lacks an equity
interest in the property and the court finds that the property is not
necessary for an effective reorganization."
The provision requiring adequate protection of the value of the
secured creditor's collateral grants the most important relief from
the automatic stay.59 Adequate protection, as described by the leg-
islative history of the B.R.A., originates from the requirement of
protection of property in the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution 0 The requirement of adequate protection ensures the
maintenance and the recoverability of the lien value in the interim
period between the filing of the petition and the acceptance of a
Creditors, 61 AM. BANXR. L.J. 341 (1987) (discussion of equity cushion analysis and sufficiency
of adequate protection).
53. See supra note 47-48.
54. See supra note 47-48. See generally Martin, Creditor Alternatives to Obtain Relief
from Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy, 87 CoM. L.J. 22 (1982) (examination of creditors'
options in seeking relief from stay).
55. See supra notes 47-48.
56. See supra notes 47-48. See also 2 L. KNrro, CO=LR ON BAKRUTrcY § 362.07(d)(1)
(15th ed. 1985) (discussion of other grounds under which cause can be shown).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
58. See supra note 47.
59. 2 L. tiNo, supra note 56, § 361.01. See also In re Beker Indus. Corp., 58 Bankr.
725, 736 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1986) (noting adequate protection in § 361 as key source of
protection for secured creditors).
60. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONO. & ADnmN. NEws 5963, 6295. See also U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V ("Nor shall property be
taken for public use without just compensation"); S. RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 5787, 5835 (discussing constitutional
source of adequate protection). See generally Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S.
273 (1940) (supporting proposition that the Constitution is the appropriate source of reliance);
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (holding that the bankruptcy
power of Congress is subject to the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution).
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plan of reorganization. 6' A debtor's possession during the reorgani-
zation period may result in depreciation or consumption of the
collateral. 62 Consequently, the adequate protection provision aims at
reconciling the tension between the constitutional prohibition against
the taking of property63 and the secured creditor's fear of loss with
the need of bankruptcy law to impair the rights and remedies of a
secured creditor. 64
Although ensuring adequate protection is important, Congress did
not expressly define in the B.R.A.65 which property is subject to
61. In re Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 34 Bankr. 965, 969 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1983) (noting the definition of adequate protection). See 2 L. Knio, supra note 56, § 361.01
(discussing the generally accepted definition of adequate protection).
62. See In re Yale Exp. Sys., Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2nd Cir. 1967) (noting that depreciation
of property requires equitable consideration in the reorganization plan).
63. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1985). "By providing a
creditor with a means of protecting its interest through section 362(d)'s adequate protection
requirement, the competing interests of the debtor's need to reorganize and the secured
creditor's entitlement to constitutional protection of its bargained-for property interests are
reconciled." Id. See also In re Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc., 46 Bankr. 892, 898-99 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985) (adequate protection, as derived from the fifth amendment protection of
property interests reconciles the competing interests of the debtor and the secured creditor,
who is entitled to constitutional protection for his bargained-for property interest); In re
Sweetwater, 40 Bankr. 733, 743 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (the origin of the adequate protection
concept shows that it was intended to protect the constitutional rights of secured creditors in
their collateral under the fifth amendment's taking and due process clauses, and to enable
them to receive the benefit of their bargain); In re Southerton Corp., 46 Bankr. 391, 397
(M.D. Pa. 1982) ("The concept [of adequate protection] stems from pre-code case law
recognizing the need to avoid impairment of the property interest of secured creditors as a
matter of constitutional law.").
64. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 285(1940) (noting the limits of
the discretionary authority vested in the bankruptcy court during the proceedings); Contin. Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 680-81 (1935)
(holding that temporary impairment of a secured creditor's rights under the bankruptcy power
of the Constitution does not violate the takings clause of the Constitution).
65. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONa.
& ADm,'. Naws at 6295. Because of extensive debates that took place in Congress over what
constituted adequate protection and the methods and timing of valuation, "adequate protec-
tion" was not defined in the bankruptcy code. Congress chose to let the courts decide due to
each case being so unique. Id. The section does not specify how value is to be determined,
nor does it specify when it is to be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case
interpretation and development. It is expected that the courts will apply the concept in light
of facts of each case and general equitable principles. It is not intended that the courts will
develop a hard and fast rule that will apply in every case. The time and method of valuation
is not specified precisely, in order to avoid that result. There are an infinite number of
variations possible in dealings between debtors and creditors, the law is continually developing,
and new ideas are continually being implemented in this field. The flexibility is important to
permit the courts to adapt to varying circumstances and changing modes of financing. Id. See
also Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 805 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1981) (holding that adequate protection is not defined in the code); General Elec.
Mfg. Corp. v. South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987, 995 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (discussing the
Congressional debate and consequences of the decision of Congress); Alibon Prod. Credit
Ass'n. v. Langley, 30 Bankr. 595, 605 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (discussing case-by-case
approach for determining adequate protection).
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adequate protection or the method for compensating a creditor for
property requiring adequate protection. 66 Rather, Congress expected
the courts to apply the concept of adequate protection in light of
the facts of each case and general equitable principles. 67 Section 361
of the B.R.A. provides a nonexclusive list of three possible methods
of compensating a creditor who lacks adequate protection.6 Section
361(1) authorizes the trustee of the bankrupt debtor to make cash
payments to a creditor to the extent that the stay results in a decrease
in the value of the creditor's interest in the collateral. 69 Section 361(2)
allows the court to provide the creditor with a lien on the collateral
to the extent that the stay decreases the value of the creditor's interest
in the collateral. 70 Section 361(3) allows the court to grant other relief
which will result in the creditor's realization of the "indubitable
equivalent" of his interest in the collateral. 71 Sections 361(1) and
361(2) only grant relief when the creditor's interest in the property
subject to the lien decreases in value. 72 Conversely, section 361(3)
grants relief for lack of adequate protection by ambiguously requiring
66. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987). See Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen
Foods, Inc., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 715 (Bankr. D. Me. 1976) (discussing "commercial
reasonableness" standarard for valuing collateral pursuant to section 506(a)). See also Brickel
v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 11 Bankr. 353, 355 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (discussing 506(a) valuation
being the level of adequate protection to which the creditor is entitled).
67. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d. Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE Co r.
& ADMuh. NEws 6295. Courts should consider the legislative history of adequate protection
and refer to equitable principles. Id. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(B), (3), (f)(2)0B) (1982 &
Supp. 1987) (using "adequate assurance" standard); § 721 (using "best interest" standard); §
1102(a)(2) (using "adequate representation" standard); § 362(d)(2)(B) (using "effective reor-
ganization" standard) (examples of where the bankruptcy code employs similar standards of
relativeness).
68. Id. § 361 (1982 & Supp. 1987). Section 361 provides:
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of
an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by:
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such entity, to the extent
that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of
this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease
in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such
stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity's
interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation
allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, as will
result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's





72. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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the creditor to realize the "indubitable equivalent" of his interest. 71
The question of what constitutes relief available under section 361(3)
has been the source of considerable debate as to the nature and
extent of granting adequate protection. 74
Before the B.R.A. was adopted, Judge Learned Hand, in In re
Murel Holding Corp. ,5 coined the term indubitable equivalent when
describing the adequate protection necessary for creditors subjected
to an unfavorable and unfair reorganization plan under the cram-
down provisions of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.76 Section 361(3) of the
B.R.A. incorporated the term "indubitable equivalent" as a "catch-
all" provision to allow courts to utilize alternative methods of
ensuring adequate protection other than cash payments and liens. 77
The intended effect of the "indubitable equivalent" language is to
73. See, e.g., Universal Coops., Inc. v. FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
that indubitable equivalent of adequate protection does not require patronage certificates to
be valued at present value); Dogpatch Properties, Inc. v. Dogpatch U.SA., Inc., 810 F.2d
782 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that personal guarantee by CEO of debtor provides indubitable
equivalent of secured creditor's interest); Bray v. Shenandoah Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 789
F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that indubitable equivalents are questions of fact rooted in
measurements of value and the credibility of witnesses); In re Wolsky, 53 Bankr. 751, 758
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1985) (holding that determination of indubitable equivalent on a case-by-case
basis); In re Aegean Fare, Inc., 33 Bankr. 745, 748 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (holding that
indubitable equivalent of adequate protection does not require cash payment equivalent of
interest to creditor).
74. Id. Universal Coops., Inc. v. FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d 1149, 1154 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting
considerable debate surrounding the interpretation of indubitable equivalent).
75. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
76. Id. at 942.
In construing so vague a grant, we are to remember not only the underlying purposes
of the section, but the constitutional limitations to which it must conform. It is
plain that "adequate protection" must be completely compensatory; and that pay-
ment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is
indeed the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety
of his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his money or at
least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute was intended to
deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders, unless by a substitute of the
most indubitable equivalence.
Id.
77. See 124 CoNG. REc. 32395 (1978). The indubitable equivalent language was the result
of a compromise, since the House and Senate could not agree upon the inclusion of admin-
istrative expenses as an element of adequate protection. The House version allowed the award
of administrative expenses for a decrease in the value of the secured creditor's collateral. The
Senate version limited adequate protection to 361(1) and 361(2). Id. See also S. RP. No. 989
at 127, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787,
5913 ("The indubitable equivalent language is intended to follow the strict approach taken by
Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935)"). See generally
Ostapski & McCrary, Consideration for Lost Opportunity Costs as Adequate Protection for
Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy Proceedings, FLA. B.J., July-August 1987, at 33 (pro-
posing inclusion of term "indubitable equivalent" in plan confirmation and cram-down
procedures as well as Section 361 strongly suggests an intention to protect the value of the
creditor's interest and not just the bare value of the collateral).
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provide the debtor or trustee greater flexibility in determining a
method of adequate protection?8 The uncodified definition of "in-
dubitable equivalent" resulted, however, in ambiguous interpretation
and confused application by the courts.79 The confusion was created
when determining whether the "indubitable equivalent" language
provides a method for adequately protecting a pre-existing interest
in property or whether it creates an interest in property, the right to
foreclosure, for the undersecured creditor which requires adequate
protection.8 0
B. Case Law
The issue addressed by the courts is whether undersecured creditors,
under the concept of adequate protection in sections 361 and 362 of
the B.R.A. have a right to foreclose on the undersecured creditors
collateral. 81 The first circuit court to address this issue was the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in In re American Mariner Industries, Inc.
82
78. See Comment, Adequate Protection of the Undersecured Creditor During the Auto-
matic Stay in Chapter 11 Cases: Compensation for Opportunity Cost or Maintenance of the
Value of the Collateral?, 5 J. L. & CoM. 259, 260 (1985) (discussing differing case law
interpretations of 11 U.S.C. §§ 361 and 362(d)). The B.R.A. also provides the debtor greater
flexibility by preventing oversecured and undersecured creditors from requesting the court to
propose a method to provide adequate protection of the creditor's collateral. See also In re
Saint Peter's School, 16 Bankr. 404, 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that debtor has
affirmative duty to propose protection of secured interest); American Sec. Bank v. Robson,
10 Bankr.362, 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981) (holding that the debtor or trustee has the exclusive
right to devise a scheme to provide adequate protection). H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess,
338, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmEN. NEws at 6295 (discussing intention of
Congress not to put courts in administrative role, but rather empower debtor to propose device
to supply adequate protection).
79. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. See also 11 U.S.C. 361(3) (1982 & Supp.
1987). See In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing meaning of indubitable
equivalent language). See generally Gordanier, The Indubitable Equivalent of Reclamation:
Adequate Protection for Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J.
299 (1980) (discussing significance of inclusion of term "indubitable equivalence" in section
361).
80. Compare In re Smithfield Estate, Inc., 48 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985)
(holding that maintenance of the value of the collateral is the sole purpose of providing
adequate protection) and In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987, 996 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
(holding that payments of interest as opportunity costs is not within the intended Congressional
definition of adequate protection) with Greives v. Bank of W. Ind., 81 Bankr. 912 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that the "indubitable equivalent" language of section 361(3) encom-
passes the undersecured creditor's claim for payment of interest on collateral) and In re Feather
River Orchards, 56 Bankr. 972 (Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1986) (holding that interest payments on
collateral is relief allowable within the indubitable equivalent language of section 361(3)).
81. See infra notes 82-142 and accompanying text.
82. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). The court noted that eight bankruptcy courts had
already considered and rejected the argument that adequate protection requires a debtor to
make postpetition interest payments. See id. at 434 & n.9.
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In American Mariner, the debtor, a manufacturer of recreational
boats, obtained a loan from Crocker National Bank secured by
machinery and equipment."3 When American Mariner filed a reor-
ganization petition, the debt to Crocker, including accrued interest,
was approximately $370,000.84 The liquidation value of the collateral
securing American Mariner's debt was $110,000.85 Shortly after the
filing of the petition, Crocker sought relief from the automatic stay
and requested adequate protection in the form of monthly payments
to compensate for potential earnings from liquidation and reinvest-
ment of the collateral. 86
Crocker, an undersecured creditor, argued that a creditor's interest
in property includes the right of foreclosure and the automatic stay
provision in section 362(a) decreases the present value of the creditor's
right of foreclosure. 87 Since the value of the interest in property was
decreasing, Crocker moved for adequate protection under section
362(d)(1). 8 Crocker argued that section 362(d)(1) should provide ade-
quate protection by requiring the debtor to make postpetition interest
payments which reflect a reasonable return on reinvestment of the
liquidation value of the collateral.8 9 Crocker thus concluded that the
undersecured creditor could realize the "indubitable equivalent" of its
property interest as specified under section 361(3). 90 The American
Mariner court held that the undersecured creditor deserves compensation
for any delay in enforcing the right to foreclose on the collateral during
the period between the petition and the confirmation of the plan.91
Consequently, the court required the debtor in American Mariner to
compensate the undersecured creditor for lost opportunity costs92 arising
from the delay in the exercise of the right to foreclose.Y




87. Id. at 427-28. See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
88. 734 F.2d 426-28 (9th Cir. 1984).
89. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 427.
90. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
91. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 435.
92. See Epstein & Fuller, Chapters 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code-Observations on
Using Case Authority from One of the Chapters in Proceedings under the Other, 38 VAND.
L. REv. 901, 914 (1985) (noting difficulty in distinguishing "opportunity costs" from post-
petition interest). The courts, addressing the issue presented in American Mariner, have provided
different labels for the type of relief sought from section 362(d)(1). Id. The payments awarded
to creditors have been referred to as opportunity costs, present value, and postpetition interest.
Id. All of these terms, however, actually refer to the payment of interest on the value of the
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The American Mariner court found statutory interpretation and
case law supporting the ruling that Crocker was entitled to adequate
protection of the lost opportunity costs. 94 The court looked at the
plain meaning of the terms used in section 361(1) of the B.R.A., 95
which requires adequate protection of the secured creditor's collateral
to the extent that the value of the secured creditor's collateral
decreases during the stay. 96 The court also looked at the legislative
history to determine the intent of Congress. 97 The court noted stat-
utory language requiring adequate protection of the value of the
secured creditor's interest in the collateral98 and the Congressional
statement that the creditor should receive the benefit of the bargained-
for value.99 The court found that the "value" term of section 361(1)
encompasses the present value of the creditor's investment at the
collateral. Id.
However, "opportunity cost payments" are simply postpetition interest payments in
sheep's clothing-"compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use
or forbearance or detention of money," albeit on the value of the collateral rather
than on the principal amount of the debt as called for by the contract.
In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380, 1382 n.l (5th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). See In re Deeter, 53 Bankr. 623, 629 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (payments for lost
opportunity costs are "interest payment"); In re B & W Tractor Co., 38 Bankr. 613, 617
(Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1984) (opportunity cost payments are postpetition interest payments).
93. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 426. The court stated that "the debtor should be
permitted maximum flexibility in structuring a proposal for adequate protection" that would
provide the creditor with the value of his bargained-for rights. Id. at 435. However, the
amount of this compensation must equal the amount that the creditor could have made between
the filing of the petition and the confirmation of the plan by foreclosing on the collateral and
reinvesting the proceeds at the market rate. Id. at 435. Additionally, the court noted the
compensation should take account of several factors in calculating the appropriate compen-
sation, including the usual time and expense involved in taking possession of and selling
collateral and the possibility that the market rate of interest will exceed the contract rate. Id.
at 435 n.12.
94. Id. at 429-35.
95. Watt v. Alaska, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1981) (noting that the starting point for
statutory construction of statutory language is the plain meaning apparent on the face of the
statute); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S 1 (1980) (noting the plain meaning is always the starting
point).
96. In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 430(9th Cir. 1984). See also 11
U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
97. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430-32.
98. Id. at 430.
99. Id. at 430-31. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6295. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the
benefit of their bargain. Id. There may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured
creditor an absolute right to his bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimental to the
bankruptcy laws. Id. Thus, this section recognizes the availability of alternate means of
protecting a secured creditor's interest. Id. Though the creditor might not receive his bargain
in kind, the purpose of the section is to ensure that the secured creditor receives in value
essentially what he bargained for. Id. See also In re Bell & Beckwith, 821 F.2d 333 (6th Cir.
1987). (ensuring creditor benefit of bargain may work disadvantage to creditor if bargain turns
out poorly).
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point he could have foreclosed on the collateral absent the automatic
stay. 100 The court held that the creditor's right to possession of
collateral upon default was a bargained-for right whose present value
Congress intended to protect. 1°1
The American Mariner court also interpreted the language of
section 361(3) of the B.R.A., which provides for adequate protection
by allowing the creditor's realization of the "indubitable equivalent"
of the creditor's interest in the property.102 The court first noted that
the plain meaning of section 361(3) provides a "catch-all" alternative
to adequate protection. 10 3 The court then examined other uses of the
phrase "indubitable equivalent" in case law and elsewhere in the
B.R.A..104 The court compared the inclusion of the term "indubitable
equivalent" in section 361(3)105 and section 1129, which requires
adequate protection of the present value of any secured party's claim
prior to confirming a plan by the "cram-down" method. 1 6 The court
held that since Congress understood the meaning of "indubitable
equivalent" and the In re Murel application when the term "indu-
bitable equivalent" was incorporated into the B.R.A., 107 inclusion of
the same terminology in section 361(3) illustrates the intent to adopt,
or at least to encourage, the strict approach of section 1129(b)(2). 103
The American Mariner court bolstered the conclusion by citing the
Supreme Court ruling in Butner v. United Statesc9 which held that
100. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431. The court noted that the value term is intended
to have a broad scope in the context of providing adequate protection to secured creditors.
Id.
101. Id. The court noted that although debtors were not being given temporary relief
during bankruptcy proceedings, it is consistent with the provisions of §§ 361 and 362 that
clearly protect creditors at the expense of debtors. Id. at 431-32. The court supported this
proposition by citing 361(e) (automatically terminating the stay if the court does not hold a
hearing within 30 days) and section 362(0 (providing creditors with ex parte relief) and referred
to section 361(g) (placing on the debtor in possession the burden of proving the creditor's
interest is adequately protected). Id.
102. Id. at 432. See also 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
103. Id. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432.
104. Id. at 432.
105. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
106. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430-32. See also supra notes 33-38 and accom-
panying text.
107. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434. See also In re Rowe, 43 Bankr. 157, 159 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1984) (noting that the legislative history of the code makes it clear that the phrase
indubitable equivalent is intended to follow the strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand
in In re Murel Holding Corp.)
108. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434. But see In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 38
Bankr. 595, 598 (Bankr. Idaho 1984) (holding that congressional insertion of the indubitable
equivalent language in § 361(3) does not impose the same requirements as for fair and equitable
treatment of a secured creditor under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)).
109. 440 U.S. 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603,609
(1961), for rule that insolvent debtors should not profit unfairly by filing for bankruptcy).
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insolvent debtors should not receive a windfall by the happenstance
of bankruptcy. 110 The American Mariner court concluded that when
the undersecured creditor is stayed from foreclosing on the collateral,
while the debtor benefits from the creditor's money, the debtor and
his unsecured creditors receive a windfall at the expense of the secured
creditor.' Thus, the Ninth Circuit in American Mariner not only
held the undersecured creditor had the right to foreclose, but was
also automatically entitled to compensation for the delay in enforcing
the right during the term of the automatic stay."2
The Fourth circuit, in Grundy National Bank v. Tandem Mining
Corp.,"3 subsequently adopted the Ninth Circuit position."4  In
Grundy, a deep coal mining contractor obtained a loan from Grundy
National Bank. The loan was secured by a wheel loader and a battery
charger." 5 The property had a value less than the outstanding debt
when the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition." 6 Grundy National Bank
filed for relief from the automatic stay which prevented him from
foreclosing on the collateral." 7 The Grundy court, relying primarily
on the decision in American Mariner, held that the undersecured
creditor has a right to foreclose on the collateral and is entitled to
periodic payments of interest until either a plan of reorganization is
confirmed, the case is closed or dismissed, the collateral is relin-
quished, or the automatic stay is lifted."8
The Grundy court also followed the American Mariner rule that
sections 361 and 362 require that the creditor receive the value of
his bargained-for rights." 9 Grundy, however, departed from the
American Mariner ruling that the entitlement to interest begins upon
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 20 Grundy determined that the
entitlement to interest cannot begin until after the creditor asks for
110. American Mariner, 734 F.2d Bat 435.
111. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 435.
112. Id. As long as the creditor receives the value of his bargained-for rights, the court
retained the policy behind sections 361 and 362 which allow the debtor maximum flexibility
in structuring a proposal for adequate protection. Id. The court then noted a few general
guidelines that the debtor should consider when proposing the method of providing adequate
protection. Id. at 435 n.12.
113. 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1438.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1440.
119. Id. at 1441. See also supra note 108.
120. In re American Mariner Indus. Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1984).
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relief from the automatic stay, plus an additional delay approximating
the usual time required to repossess and sell the collateral.'
2'
In contrast, the Eighth circuit in In re Briggs Transportation Co.1
22
diverged from American Mariner and Grundy by holding that the
B.R.A. does not entitle an undersecured creditor, as a matter of law,
to compensation for the delay in foreclosing on the collateral that
accrue because of a bankruptcy filing.12' The court began by address-
ing the creditor's constitutional challenge under the takings clause of
the fifth amendment. 124 The court concluded that the protection
afforded creditors by the adequate protection requirement under
section 362(d)(1) and the temporary nature of the delay of a creditor's
right to enforce a lien satisfied constitutional requirements.'2
The court reviewed the legislative history to formulate an approach
for determiring what rights require adequate protection. 26 The court
stated that the B.R.A. scheme indicates that adequate protection
encompasses a broad range of creditor's interests and is susceptible
to a wide range of fact situations. 127 In addition, the court noted
that the statutory requirement of "indubitable equivalent" broadens,
rather than narrows, the range of solutions available to determine
what interests in property are to be adequately protected. 2  The
court, thus, concluded that requiring protection as a matter of law
121. 754 F.2d at 1441.
122. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1350 (8th Cir. 1985). The trial court followed
the decision in American Mariner by ruling that the undersecured creditors were entitled to
interest as a matter of law. Id. at 1341.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1982) (citing Justice
Brandeis' first articulation of the fifth amendment limitation on the bankruptcy power in
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935)).
125. 780 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1985). The competing interests of the debtor's need to
reorganize and the secured creditor's entitlement to constitutional protection of its bargained-
for property interests are reconciled through section 362(d)'s adequate protection requirement.
Id. See First Bank of Miller v. Wieseler, 45 Bankr. 871, 874 n.1 (D.S.D. 1985) (the United
States Supreme Court has held that the bankruptcy power is subject to the fifth amendment
due process clause prohibiting the taking of private property without compensation despite a
public purpose for the taking); In re Magnus, 50 Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr. D. N.D.1985) (the
concept of adequate protection encompasses the basic constitutional requirement that a cred-
itor's interest in property cannot be in any respect impaired or subjected to increased risk
without assurance that the creditor will realize the benefit of its bargain); In re Sweetwater,
40 Bankr. 733, 745 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (the origin of the adequate protection concept
shows that it was intended to protect the constitutional rights of secured creditors in their
collateral under the fifth amendment's taking and due process clauses, and to enable them to
receive the benefit of their bargain).
126. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1985)
127. Id. at 1345.
128. Id. at 1346.
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contradicts the open-ended nature of the concept of adequate pro-
tection. 
1 29
The court in Briggs found that the B.R.A. mandated a flexible
case-by-case approach to determine the interests requiring adequate
protection. 30 In adopting a flexible approach, the court believed that
the bankruptcy courts should balance the interests of the debtor and
creditor and consider the circumstances of the original transaction
and when the debtor files a petition for bankruptcy. 131 The court
provided a nonexclusive list of equitable considerations to give guid-
ance to the bankruptcy courts in reconstructing the bargain between
the debtor and creditor to determine the interests entitled to adequate
protection. 3 2 The considerations set out by the court included: (1)
the quality of the collateral or the length of the stay; (2) the
appreciation, depreciation, or relative stability of the value of the
collateral; (3) the debtor's attempt to keep the collateral free from
statutory liens; and (4) the chances of a successful reorganization.1
3
By using these four considerations as guidelines and taking into
account other relevant factors, the Briggs court stated that courts
can determine the reasonable expectations of the parties. The court
concluded, therefore, that bankruptcy courts may equitably determine
the interests which require protection during the interim between the
petition and the confirmation of the plan.1
34
In circuits whose appellate courts have not determined whether
undersecured creditors have the right to foreclose on the collateral,
the majority of bankruptcy courts ruled the right does not exist,
which is contrary to American Mariner, Grundy, and Briggs.135 A
129. Id. at 1347. The relief provided to oversecured creditors in section 506(b) provides an
alternative to the adequate protection provisions in sections 361 and 362 and does not serve
as a limitation thereon. Id.
130. Id. at 1348.
131. Id. The fact that the term "adequate protection" resists precise definition indicates
that flexibility was legislated into the bankruptcy code. Id.
132. Id. at 1349.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1348-50. In dissent, Judge Gibson noted that contrary to assertions made by
the majority, American Mariner condones a case-by-case approach in determining the method
of providing adequate protection and not flexibility as to whether adequate protection is
required for the undersecured creditor. Id. at 1351. (Gibson, J. dissenting).
135. See In re The Cablehouse, Ltd., 68 Bankr. 309, 311-12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986)
(rejecting preferential treatment of undersecured creditors); In re Pullins, 65 Bankr. 560, 562-
63 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (opportunity cost not an element of adequate protection); In re
Concorde Ltd. Partnership, 67 Bankr. 717, 723-24 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986) (lost opportunity
costs "should rarely be required, if ever"); In re Rita Theatres, Inc., 68 Bankr. 256, 260
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (adequate protection is limited to protection against depreciation of
the asset); In re Smithfield Estates, Inc., 48 Bankr. 910, 914 & n.8 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1985)
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case often cited for a ruling contrary to these appellate courts is In
re South Village, Inc. in which a mortgage company with an under-
secured lien on the debtor's property sought relief from the stay.
136
The mortgage company claimed that the stay precluded the sale of
the collateral and reinvestment of the proceeds causing the company
to lose money. 13 7 The South Village court analyzed which property
interests required adequate protection under sections 361 and
362(d)(1). 38 The court found that the Bankruptcy Commission and
the House and Senate Reports emphasized that the concept of ade-
quate protection encompassed only a decrease in the value of existing
(adequate protection only encompasses protection of creditor's interest against decrease in
value of collateral); In re Penny, 52 Bankr. 816, 821 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1985) (noting that
adequate protection is designed to protect nothing more than the secured creditor's interest in
collateral from deterioration); In re Hagel Partnership, Ltd., 40 Bankr. 821, 822-23 (Bankr.
D. D.C. 1984) (rejecting undersecured creditor's claim for postpetition interest); In re Manville
Forest Prods. Corp., 43 Bankr. 293, 302 & n.7 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1984) (noting that American
Mariner holding is too expansive and citing South Village with approval); In re Aegean Fare,
Inc., 34 Bankr. 965, 969 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (no lost opportunity cost theory available to
undersecured creditors); In re XB-1 Assocs., 27 Bankr. 827, 834 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983)
(following the South Village decision); In re Saypol, 31 Bankr. 796, 799-802 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. 1983) (Congress did not intend section 361 to protect opportunity cost); In re Shriver,
33 Bankr. 176, 182 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (creditor not entitled to opportunity costs); In
re Cantrup, 32 Bankr. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (rejecting that creditors are entitled
to compensation for loss of use of collateral); In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr.
819, 826-28 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982) (adequate protection must only protect value of collateral,
not opportunity); In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 806-09 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981) (emphasizing that adequate protection must be a flexible concept which cannot be limited
by a brittle construction). But see In re 12th & N Joint Venture, 63 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. D.
D.C.1986) (citing American Mariner and Briggs favorably); In re Nesmith, 57 Bankr. 348, 349
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that court "draws succor" from American Mariner); In re
Lipply, 56 Bankr. 524, 526 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (following American Mariner); In re
Johnson, 63 Bankr. 550, 553 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (citing American Mariner with approval,
the court stated concern over problem of protecting the secured creditor's interest in the
collateral, including the right to foreclose and realize the cash value of the collateral); In re
Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 48 Bankr. 431, 433 (Bankr. D. Mass.1985) (approving American
Mariner); In re Air Vermont, Inc., 45 Bankr. 931, 935 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (citing American
Mariner favorably); In re Independence Village, Inc., 52 Bankr. 715, 727-29 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1985) (following American Mariner); In re Vanas, 50 Bankr. 988, 998-99 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1985) (following American Mariner); In re, Topper, 52 Bankr. 94, 95-96 & n.4 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1985) (stating that it is "not clear why the marginally oversecured creditor should
be able to obtain relief from stay for failure to service debt while the marginally undersecured
creditor cannot"); In re Leavell, 56 Bankr. 11, 13 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1985) (following American
Mariner); In re Deeter, 53 Bankr. 623, 626-29 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (following American
Mariner); In re Mary Harpley Builders, Inc., 44 Bankr. 151, 155-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(noting conflict and choosing to follow American Mariner); In re Levine, 45 Bankr. 333, 338
& n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (approving American Mariner); In re Monroe Park, 17 Bankr.
934, 940 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982) (adopting the Briggs case-by-case approach).
136. In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (the property held
by the debtor was a shopping mall with a value of $4,369,000). Another case heavily relied
upon is In re Aluycan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (holding that
maintenance of the value of the property and not the present value of otherwise available
funds as what is required to be protected).
137. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 988.
138. Id. at 989-90.
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collateral attributable to the stay. 1 9 In addition, the court noted that
allowing the recovery of opportunity costs may conflict with other
sections of the B.R.A.. 14 Therefore, the court held that adequate
protection does not entitle undersecured creditors to the recovery of
postpetition interest, but rather is limited to protection of the value
of the lien. 141 Thus, the court concluded that the undersecured
creditors' interest in property is limited to the value of the len which
requires adequate protection by the debtor only if the collateral
depreciates in value or dissipates in size or number. 142
The decisions of the appellate courts and lower courts complete
the spectrum of opinions on the right to foreclosure issue. The Court
of Appeals in American Mariner and Grundy require as a matter of
law protection of the present value of the undersecured creditor's
collateral. 4 The Court of Appeals in Briggs agrees with the American
Mariner and Grundy courts that the present value of the undersecured
creditor's collateral may be entitled to protection.'" The Briggs court
held, however, that whether the undersecured creditor has an interest
in property requiring adequate protection is a factual determination
by the bankruptcy judge based on the circumstances of the case. 4
Lower court cases in circuits where the Appellate Court has not
ruled, however, have ruled as a matter of law that the undersecured
creditor has no right to foreclosure which requires adequate protec-
tion.' 46 The conflict between the federal courts of appeal and the
lower courts created the opportunity for forum shopping between




In United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates, Ltd., 47 the Court granted a writ of certiorari to
139. Id. at 993.
140. Id. at 997-99. The court noted possible conflicts with sections 502(b)(2), 506(b),
1111(b) and 1124(2) which imply opportunity costs are not compensatable. Id.
141. Id. at 994.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 83-121 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 122-34 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 135-42 and accompanying text.
147. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
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resolve the conflict between the courts. 148 United Savings was the
holder of a promissory note originally executed by Timbers in the
amount of $4,100,000, the amount loaned for the purpose of con-
structing an apartment complex in northwest Houston. 149 The note
was secured by a first lien deed of trust on the apartment buildings
and an assignment of rental payments. 50 Following Timbers' default
under the note, United Savings posted the property for a foreclosure
sale under the deed of trust.'5' Timbers, however, filed its petition
under Chapter 11 of the B.R.A. on March 4, 1985, the day before
the posted foreclosure. 5 2 Thus, pursuant to B.R.A. section 362(a),
the filing of the bankruptcy petition automatically stayed United
Savings from holding the foreclosure sale or otherwise enforcing the
rights under the deed of trust.
53
On March 18, 1985, United Savings filed a motion for relief from
the automatic stay, pursuant to B.R.A. section 362(d)(1). 5 4 The
bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing and found that United
Savings was an undersecured creditor since the continually accruing
interest caused the debt to exceed the value of the property. 155 The
court found that the undersecured status, together with the inability
to foreclose and reinvest the collateral proceeds because of the stay,
denied United Savings adequate protection under section 362(d)(1).
56
The court, therefore, ordered Timbers to pay United Savings the lost
income from reinvesting the collateral proceeds which amounted to
monthly payments at 12 percent per annum of the fair market value
of the collateral. 5
7
Timbers appealed to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court decision. 5 1 On further appeal by Timbers, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the
bankruptcy court decision which was later affirmed on rehearing by
an en banc panel. 59
148. See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.







156. Id. at 629.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380
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B. The Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court, on
writ of certiorari, affirmed the decision of the appellate court.16 The
Court held that an undersecured creditor's interest in property does
not include the right to immediate foreclosure, and thus, does not
require the debtor to provide interest on the creditor's collateral as
compensation for the delay in foreclosure caused by the automatic
stay.' 6 1 The opinion was supported by the Court's interpretation of
specific provisions of the B.R.A. in the context of the overall
statutory scheme. 62 The Court first examined sections of the B.R.A.
to determine the nature of the interest sought to be protected by the
secured creditor. 63 The Court then examined sections 361 and 362
which provide relief from a automatic stay on an interest in property
because of lack of adequate protection.,61 Finally, the Court reviewed
(5th Cir. 1986, aff'd on rehearing, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc). The Fifth circuit followed
much of the same reasoning of In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 487 (Bankr. D. Utah
1482) in holding that a secured creditor required adequate protection for only the value of the
physical property securing the debt. 793 F.2d at 1385-87, 1399-1400, 1413, 1416. The court
analyzed extensively both the legislative and case law history of Sections 361 and 362. Id. at
1387-1401. The court then refuted American Mariner's rationale by noting the undesirable
subjectivity of how and when postpetition interest should be calculated and the adverse impact
on the orderly distribution of the debtor's assets resulting from interest payments. Id. at 1415-
16. On rehearing, the Fifth circuit en banc opinion reinstated the original panel opinion, added
to the majority opinion and included a dissent. 808 F.2dat 363. The en banc opinion added
a postscript noting that the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, codified as Chapter 12
of the Bankruptcy Code, amended the adequate protection provisions in Section 361 to delete
the "indubitable equivalent" language. Id. at 364-70. Jones, J. dissenting in the en banc
opinion asserted that the conclusion reached in American Mariner, that lost opportunity costs
is an interest in property requiring adequate protection, was the proper interpretation of section
361. Id. at 374-84.
160. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd. 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988). In holding that, as a matter of law, "adequate protection" does not require protection
of the "time value" of a secured creditor's state law rights to foreclose on and sell its collateral
and reinvest the proceeds, the decision of the Fifth circuit creates serious conflicts with prior
decisions of the Ninth, Fourth and Eighth circuits and of numerous lower courts as well.
Reasons for granting the writ at 10, United Savings v. Timbers, No. 86-1602, slip op. at 3
(1988). whether such protection is required or permitted by the Bankruptcy Code is perhaps
the most important and frequenty litigated issue in the entire field of bankruptcy law, and the
resolution of this issue ought not to depend upon the fortuity of the jurisdiction in which a
bankruptcy case is filed. Id. Prompt resolution of this issue and the establishment of a uniform
federal standard is required. Id.
161. Id. at 635.
162. Id. at 630.
163. Id. at 629-33.
164. Id. at 632-34.
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the legislative history of the B.R.A. for clarification of the Congres-
sional intent to redress the undersecured creditor.
65
1. Defining interests in property
The premise of the Court's opinion rested on defining the under-
secured creditors' rights in the collateral securing the debt.166 If the
undersecured creditor has a right to immediate foreclosure of the
defaulted security, then, the undersecured creditor has an interest in
property-that is, the present reinvestment value of the proceeds
from the sale of the collateral not adequately protected under section
362 unless presently reimbursed. 67 The Court chose not to engage in
a detailed analysis of the literal definition of the term "interest in
property" which is protected by section 362(d)(1).168 Rather, to
determine this definition, the Court examined separately the language
of sections 506, 552, 362(d)(2), and the substantive dispositions they
affect. 16
9
Section 506 defines when a claim is secured or unsecured and when
and how long interest may accrue on a secured claim. 70 The Court
first noted that under section 506(a) a secured creditor's interest in
property refers exclusively to the value of his collateral and not the
right to immediate foreclosure.' 7' Therefore, the Court held that the
term "interest in property" in sections 361(1) and (2) when applied
to undersecured creditors does not include the right to immediate
foreclosure.1 72 The Court then noted the general rule of section
502(b)(2) which disallows postpetition interest. 73 The Court empha-
sized that section 506 creates a limited exception to the general rule
165. Id. at 634-35.
166. Id. at 630. The central issue to the present dispute is that "interest in property" also
includes the secured party's right to take immediate possession of the defaulted security, and
apply it in satisfaction of the debt. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 630-33.
170. Id. at 630. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. See also 11 U.S.C. 506
(1982 & Supp. 1987).
171. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 630.
172. Id.
173. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (claim may be allowed except to
the extent that it is for uninatured interest). See also Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm.
v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 163 (1946) (holding that general rule in bankruptcy is that interest
ceases to accrue upon commencement of proceedings); Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344
(1911) (holding that a principle of bankruptcy law is that interest on debt ceases to accrue
upon filing of bankruptcy petition).
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by allowing payment of interest to the oversecured creditor as long
as there is a "security cushion": the value of the secured collateral
that exceeds the principal amount of the debt. 74 Since section 506(b)
specifically establishes the prerequisite to receiving postpetition inter-
est, the Court held that the undersecured creditor, who has no
"security cushion," cannot seek relief from a contradictory interpre-
tation of the general relief provided by section 362(d)(1).
175
The Court then noted the procedural requirement of section
552(b). 176 Generally, a secured creditor cannot satisfy the claim from
property acquired by the estate or debtor postpetition. 177 Section
552(b), however, allows for postpetition proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of the collateral to be applied towards the secured
creditor's claim if expressly provided for in the security agreement
and the interest has been perfected under state law. 17 Therefore, the
postpetition property that represented the relief granted United Sav-
ings by the bankruptcy court required adherence to the procedural
requirements of section 552(b).171 The Court held that the procedural
prerequisite of section 552(b) would be improperly circumvented if
the undersecured creditor could avoid 552(b) and obtain identical
relief under section 362(d)(1) by relabeling the postpetition property
as the use value of the collateral.
8 0
Finally, the Court noted that recognizing an undersecured creditor's
claimed right to take immediate possession would improperly nullify
the relief provided by section 362(d)(2).111 Section 362(d)(2) is a
common source of relief available to undersecured creditors upon a
showing that the debtor does not have an equity interest in the
collateral and the collateral is not necessary to an effective reorgan-
ization.8 2 If, as argued by United Savings, a right to immediate
174. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 631. See supra note 169.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 631-32. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (noting the
general rule that a prepetition security interest does not reach property acquired by the estate
or debtor postpetition and the exception allowing postpetition proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of the collateral to be an interest in property of the creditor only if the security
agreement expressly provides for an interest in such property and the interest has been perfected
under applicable nonbankruptcy law).
177. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 631.
178. Id. See also In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436, 1442-44 (1986) (holding that the perfection
requirement of section 552(b) is a matter of state law).
179. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 631-32. Timbers agreed to pay the postpetition interest ordered
due by the bankruptcy court from the postpetition rents from the collateral. Id. at 629.
180. Id. at 631-32.
181. Id. at 632-33.
182. Id. at 632. See also 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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possession existed under section 362(d)(1), relief would always be
available since the ability to reinvest the proceeds from the sale of
the collateral would never be adequately protected. 83 Rejecting this
argument, the Court theorized that the undersecured creditor would
seek relief only if the collateral was not depreciating or if the
undersecured creditor was already being compensated by the debtor
to adequately protect the collateral at issue but nonetheless wanted
to foreclose.'84 The Court concluded that United Savings' interpre-
tation would make section 362(d)(2) a provision providing relief to
unharmed creditors and resulting in a practical nullity of its usefulness
in the B.R.A..185 The Court, in dictum, noted that United Savings
did not request, but might have been successful in obtaining, relief
under section 362(d)(2) by asserting that Timbers did not have equity
in the collateral, and that the collateral was not necessary to an
effective reorganization. 186
2. Indubitable Equivalent
The Court then examined whether the "indubitable equivalent"
term in section 361(3) was intended to provide the "catch-all" relief
sought by United Savings. 87 Although the "indubitable equivalent"
term in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) provides for the payment of post-
petition interest to undersecured creditors, the Court rejected the
analogy that section 361(3) provides similar relief.'88 The Court stated
that the timing with which section 361(3) relief is granted is key to
distinguishing sections 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 361(3).189 The "indubi-
table equivalent" language of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) allows the
secured creditor to receive cash payment equal to the present value
of his collateral. 90 However, the Court stated that section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) expressly limits receipt of this relief until the
effective date of the reorganization plan.19' In contrast, the Court
183. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 632.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. United Savings has never sought relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2) or
on any ground other than lack of adequate protection. Id.
187. Id. See also supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
188. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 633.
189. Id.
190. Id. See also supra note 33.
191. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 633. See also 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1982 & Supp.
1987). The holder of a claim receives payments as of the effective date of the plan totalling
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stated that section 361(3) does not identify a similar specified time
when the relief to be realized must be granted.1 92 Thus, the Court
concluded that realization of the indubitable equivalent of the un-
dersecured creditor's collateral obviously need not result until com-
pletion of the reorganization. 93
The Court also rejected United Savings' assertion that the "indu-
bitable equivalent" term in section 361(3) connotes reimbursement
for the use value of collateral as originally stated in In re Murel
Holding Corp.194 The Court stated that in In re Murel, the indubitable
equivalence language referred to granting relief for the jeopardized
principal amount of the debt and not the interest on the debt which
was assured. 95 The Court concluded that the original use of the
indubitable equivalent term in In re Murel and subsequent incorpo-
ration into section 1129 does not indicate a Congressional intent that
outweighs the statutory inconsistencies created by recognizing an
undersecured creditor's right to immediate foreclosure.
96
3. Legislative History and Pre-B.R.A. Case Law
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the B.R.A. to support
further the conclusion that undersecured creditors are not entitled to
postpetition interest payments. 197 The Court noted that the legislative
history of section 362(d)(1) is silent as to the undersecured creditor's
the value of the holder's interest in the estate's interest in the property. Timbers, 108 S. Ct.
at 633.
192. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 633, "[S]imilarity of outcome between [sections] 361(3) and
1129 would be demanded only if the former read 'such other relief as will give such entity,
as of the date of the relief, the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such
property."' (emphasis added)
193. Id.
194. Id. at 633-34. See In Re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2nd Cir. 1935). See also
supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
195. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 633.
196. Id. See also supra notes 170-186 and accompanying text. The Court also noted that
the failure to interpret Section 362(d)(1) to require compensation to undersecured creditors for
delay in foreclosing on the collateral will result in the anamolous situation that unsecured
creditors will receive postpetition interest under Section 726(aX5) when the debtor proves
solvent whereas undersecured creditors would not receive interest. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 634.
The Court concluded that the apparent anamoly is entirely avoidable if the undersecured
creditor waives his entire security and proves his claim as an unsecured one. Id. The Court
conceded the inconsistency created when the debtor proves solvent, but concluded that the
situation is rare and the inconsistency minor in comparison to those created by the United
Savings interpretation. Id. See also supra notes 170-186 and accompanying text.
197. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 634-35.
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right to postpetiton interest on the secured collateral. 9 Since pre-
B.R.A. case law did not authorize payment of postpetition interest
to the undersecured creditor, the Court held that legislative silence
indicates the intent not to change existing law. 199
The Court then examined the alternative argument that legislative
silence indicates a desire to substitute the entitlement to postpetition
interest on the collateral for pre-B.R.A. law which gave the under-
secured creditor a right to immediate foreclosure. 200 The Court re-
jected the substitution argument by holding that pre-B.R.A. law did
not clearly give the undersecured creditor a right to immediate
foreclosure. 20 The Court noted that of Chapters X, XI and XII of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, later consolidated into Chapter 11 of
the B.R.A., Chapters X and XII granted no right to immediate
foreclosure to the undersecured creditor.202 In response to the alleged
support in prior Chapter XI case law, the Court stated that the
support was cited from dicta in cases which also found additional
reasoning to grant relief from the stay.203 In addition, an equal
number of other prior Chapter XI cases denied the undersecured
creditor the right to foreclose immediately.204 Therefore, the Court
held that the undersecured creditor's right to immediate foreclosure
was not the pre-B.R.A. rule of law, and thus the alleged departure
would not require comment in the legislative history.2° Upon affirm-
ing the judgment of the Fifth circuit, the Court concluded that, as
a matter of law, the undersecured creditor's alleged right to foreclo-
sure during the duration of the stay is not an interest in property
which must be afforded adequate protection. 206
198. Id. at 634. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 339; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 53, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AmDMN. NEws, pp. 5839, 6295 (discussing that secured creditors should
not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain which is the sole source of United Savings
claim that the undersecured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest).
199. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 634.
200. Id. at 634-35.
201. Id. at 635.
202. Id. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
203. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 635. See also In re Bric of America, Inc., 4 Collier Bankr.
Cas. (MB) 34, 39-40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1975) (discussing various reasons for granting relief
from the stay); In re O.K. Motels, I Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 416, 419-420 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1974) (noting relief from the stay is imminent).
204. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 635. See also In re Coolspring Estates, Inc., 12 Collier Bankr.
Cas. (MB) 55, 60-61 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1977) (rejecting undersecured creditors' alleged right
to foreclosure); In re Royal Scot, Ltd., 2 Bankr. 374, 376-377 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1976)
(ruling that undersecured creditors are not entitled to foreclose on collateral).
205. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 635.
206. Id.
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III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
By rejecting the undersecured creditor's alleged right to foreclosure
as a matter of law, the Supreme Court has re-established the goals
of maintaining orderly bankruptcy procedures and promoting reor-
ganization.2 The approaches advocated in American Mariner, Grundy
and Briggs would clearly have complicated bankruptcy procedure by
inducing all undersecured creditors in all bankruptcy suits to file a
motion for relief from the automatic stay.20° Undersecured creditors
would be induced to file these motions in order to receive adequate
protection of the right to foreclose on the collateral which would
otherwise not be compensable. Additionally, the time delays caused
by calculating the amount of adequate protection due and the orderly
distribution of the postpetition interest payments to undersecured
creditors would likely slow the reorganization process. The goal of
promoting the confirmation of a reorganization plan would also be
hindered as a result of the draining of assets from a company most
likely in dire need of liquid assets. 2°9 The automatic stay provides
the debtor a breathing spell to facilitate formation of a reorganization
plan by preventing creditors from taking certain actions against the
debtor. 210 In addition, payment of postpetition interest to underse-
cured creditors would inequitably shift to the unsecured creditor most
of the risk that the reorganization would fail by draining the debtor
of liquid assets prior to plan confirmation during the postpetition
period. 21'
207. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADimuN. NEws 6296 (discussing goals of bankruptcy law).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (discussing prerequisites for approval of a
confirmation plan including determination of feasibility in paragraph (11)). See also S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 128, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADuM,. NEws 5852
(the feasibility requirement of 1129(a)(11) is a slight elaboration of the law that has developed
in application of the word "feasible" in chapter X of the B.R.A.).
209. Compare In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that undersecured creditors' collateral is not entitled to protection), aff'd on rehearing,
808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc) and In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the question of compensation to the undersecured creditor is a case-by-case
determination and not a per se matter) with Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp.,
754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation
once relief from the automatic stay is requested) and In re Am. Mariner Indus., Inc. 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation during
the term of the automatic stay).
210. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
211. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946)
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The Timbers decision will not result in adherence to every goal of
the B.R.A.. The bankruptcy law is designed to ensure that all
creditors are treated equally. 212 Denying undersecured creditors com-
pensation for the delay in foreclosure caused by the stay allows the
estate to profit from the use of the collateral during the bankruptcy
proceedings. The profits derived from the use of the undersecured
creditors' collateral will eventually benefit unsecured creditors at the
expense of the undersecured creditors. Therefore, creditors are not
treated equally after the Timbers decision.
The Timbers decision actually protects some interests of the un-
dersecured creditor by restricting the scope of relief that may be
provided from the automatic stay. Creditors, including undersecured,
typically prefer the filing of a reorganization plan as opposed to
facing outright liquidation, which would most likely result in a lower
realization of the debt. Preservation of the value of the estate
facilitates formation of the reorganization plan. Since the automatic
stay preserves the value of the estate, the limiting of relief from the
automatic stay promotes the undersecured creditor's interest in the
filing of a reorganization plan. The undersecured creditor also avoids
the race among creditors to obtain first access to the debtor's assets
by filing a motion for relief from the automatic stay, which was
induced by the American Mariner, Grundy, and Briggs decisions.
213
Thus, the Timbers decision adheres to the congressional goal that
bankruptcy rules provide an orderly liquidation procedure for all
creditors . 214
The undersecured creditor is not foreclosed from pursuing other
methods of relief from the automatic stay after the Timbers decision.
Undersecured creditors can also request relief under section 362(d)(2). 215
(noting that secured creditors must bear some of the risks of the reorganization process). See
also H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. &
AnDm. Naws 6297 (noting that bankruptcy laws are designed to ensure all creditors are treated
equally).
212. See supra notes 82-134 and accompanying text.
213. Compare In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that undersecured creditors' collateral is not entitled to protection), aff'd on rehearing,
808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc) and In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the question of compensation to the undersecured creditor is a case-by-case
determination and not a per se matter) with Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp.,
754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation
once relief from the automatic stay is requested) and In re Am. Mariner Indus., Inc. 734 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the undersecured creditor is entitled to compensation during
the term of the automatic stay).
214. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 362(dX2) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (an alternative method to grant relief from
an automatic stay).
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Section 362(d)(2) requires a showing by the creditor that the debtor
lacks an equity interest in the collateral and that the collateral is not
necessary to an effective reorganization. 216 In addition, the underse-
cured creditor may be granted relief under section 362(d)(1) if the
collateral decreases in actual value during the term of the automatic
stay.217 The undersecured creditor is also protected from undue delay
by the debtor in filing a reorganization plan, thus limiting the period
that the present value of the collateral is denied.
218
The Timbers decision will likely influence the formation and con-
tent of future loan agreements involving lenders willing to assume
an undersecured position. The Court in Timbers refused to consider
the terms or circumstances of the original loan agreement. 2 9 By
disr.egarding the particular collateral securing the debt, the Court
overlooked an essential element to many loan agreements. Lenders
secured by collateral that is specifically tailored to the debtor's
business do not expect to reclaim the collateral and reinvest the
proceeds because of the limited market for the colateral. 2 Therefore,
the interest rate in the loan agreement will be higher to reflect the
risk of not being able to reclaim the collateral. Conversely, lenders
secured by collateral that is liquid in nature (inventory, accounts
receivable, etc.) structure a loan agreement under the expectation
that the collateral is easily converted into cash and reinvested. 221
Therefore, the debtor can bargain for the funding itself, greater
funding than originally anticipated, or a lower interest rate because
of the lower risk assumed by the lender resulting from the lender's
ability to reinvest the value of the collateral upon default. As
mandated by Timbers, however, the automatic stay will prevent the
lenders from receiving the primary expectation that the liquid collat-
eral will continue to generate cash flow even upon default.m Con-
sequently, the Timbers decision strips the debtor of the bargaining
tool provided by securing debt with liquid collateral.
216. Id.
217. Id. § 362(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (an interest in property is usually not adequately
protected if it is decreasing in value).
218. Id. § 1121 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (providing that a party in interest may file a plan if
the debtor does not file a plan within 120 days following the date of filing).
219. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Assocs., Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
220. Comment, The Recovery of Opportunity Costs as Just Compensation: A Takings
Analysis of Adequate Protection, 81 NW. U. L. REv. 953, 983 (1987) (discussion of alternative
approach to determine whether adequate protection is required as compared to American
Mariner, Grundy, Briggs and the Fifth circuit decision in Timbers).
221. Id.
222. Timbers, 108 S. Ct. at 635.
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Without the incentive of liquid collateral, lenders might be less
willing to assume an undersecured position. Lenders previously willing
to assume an undersecured position will now chose either to charge
a higher interest rate to compensate for the lack of protection of the
security or seek an oversecured position. The resulting effects of the
creditor's choice are twofold. First, the assets of a business that may
be secured as collateral on a loan are clearly limited. If the circum-
stances of the company or the industry in which the company operates
dictate the desire of the lender to seek security for his loan as
opposed to higher interest rates, a limited number of lenders will be
able to ensure the desired oversecured position. Consequently, the
availability of loans might be threatened because of creditors' future
unwillingness to enter an undersecured position.
Second, higher interest costs might push a financially unstable
company into bankruptcy. Thus, bankruptcy filings have the potential
to increase and counterbalance the result that the Timbers decision
impliedly produces: congestion of the bankruptcy courts. The poten-
tial lack of risk-oriented lending might tap an important source of
funds for troubled organizations that are not capable of paying a
higher interest rate and that are without adequate collateral to ensure
an oversecured position. Although the Timbers decision might adhere
to the fundamental concern of bankruptcy law (protecting the estate
from dismemberment, providing temporary relief to the debtor and
providing for maximization of the amount to be realized to all
creditors), the long-range effects of Timbers might result in more




In Timbers, the United States Supreme Court resolves one of the
most heavily litigated bankruptcy issues since the passage of the
B.R.A. of 1978. The Court held that the undersecured creditor's
alleged right to foreclose on the collateral during the bankruptcy
proceedings is not an interest in property requiring adequate protec-
tion. Thus, the Court concluded that the undersecured creditor is
not entitled to interest on the collateral for the delay in foreclosing
on the collateral caused by the automatic stay. The Court's ruling
223. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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ceases forum shopping between jurisdictions which occurred because
of conflicting rulings among the circuits and lower bankruptcy courts.
The Timbers decision aims to ensure adherence to the fundamental
goals of bankruptcy law and the basic concerns of limiting congestion
and complications encountered in bankruptcy proceedings. In addi-
tion, the Timbers decision actually promotes the ultimate concern of
the undersecured creditor, avoidance of outright liquidation, and
does not preclude the undersecured creditor from seeking other
methods of relief from the automatic stay. The Timbers decision,
however, will ultimately influence the debtor-creditor relationship
outside the scope of bankruptcy proceedings. Because debtors will
find bargaining with some lenders harder and lending tougher to
obtain, the Timbers decision might result in an increase in bankruptcy
filings..
The Court in Timbers avoided an ad hoc balancing of the com-
peting policies that underlie bankruptcy law. The Court's analytical
approach of strictly interpreting the statutory language of the B.R.A.
ensures adherence to congressional intent. Future judicial interpre-
tations of the B.R.A. should consider the effects of statutory inter-
pretation outside the scope of bankruptcy proceedings with the
Court's approach in Timbers, but avoid judicial overstepping into
an area expressly empowered to Congress by the Constitution-
bankruptcy law.
Marc Forsythe
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